Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
INTRODUCTION
Residential segregation on the basis of race and ethnicity is a phenomenon present in every metropolitan area throughout the United States. 1 Given its pervasive nature, the causes and consequences of segregation have attracted considerable academic scrutiny. Researchers investigating the underlying causes have attempted to assess the extent to which racial segregation can be explained by differences in income, wealth, and education across race; 2,3 in terms of consequences, a number of papers have explored the effects of living in a segregated neighborhood on individual outcomes. 4 This paper studies the causes and consequences of segregation from a new perspective.
The primary economic analysis builds on a series of theoretical papers that have analyzed residential sorting in a general equilibrium setting. Important examples include work by Romer (1984, 1993) , Benabou (1993 Benabou ( , 1996 , Rogerson (1996, 1998) , and Nechyba (1999 and Nechyba ( , 2000 . All feature models with multiple communities, heterogeneous agents who are mobile across communities, and community compositions that are endogenous to the sorting process. As these papers d emonstrate, general equilibrium sorting models provide a coherent framework for analyzing interdependent individual decisions that drive aggregate outcomes, 5 proving particularly useful in tracing the complex and otherwise difficult-to-predict effects of policy. Thus Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) provide a tractable analytical framework for examining the effects of school finance reforms that both change school funding and alter household location decisions. In a more complex setting, Nechyba (2000) sets out a computational model that explores the effects of school vouchers using general equilibrium simulations, allowing for households to choose schools and relocate across neighborhoods. In 1 In the year 2000, for example, black households in the Detroit metropolitan area lived in Census tracts that were on average almost 80 percent black and only 15 percent white, while in marked contrast, white households lived in Census tracts that were only 5 percent black and 90 percent white. In the San Francisco Bay Area, where racial divisions might seem less severe, the typical black household lives in a neighborhood with more than nine times the fraction of black households found in neighborhoods resided in by the typical white household. 2 See Massey and Denton (1987 , 1993 , Miller and Quigley (1990) , Harsman and Quigley (1995) , Borjas (1998) and Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004a) , among others. 3 A related body of work has explored whether racial segregation is driven by the decentralized preferences of households as they make their residential location decisions or by some form of centralized discrimination. Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) examine segregation patterns over the full course of the 20 th century, concluding that centralized racism was much mo re important in driving segregation in the earlier part of the century. Other notable papers include King and Mieszkowski (1973) , Yinger (1978) , Schafer (1979) , and Kiel and Zabel (1996) . 4 See Borjas (1995) and Cutler and Glaser (1997) for important contributions. 5 Romer (1984, 1993) focus on conditions needed to prove existence in multicommunity models that incorporate voting. both papers, allowing for mobility gives rise to effects in general equilibrium that would not be apparent in partial equilibrium, where household sorting is abstracted from.
In common with the applied theory literature, the current paper also specifies a general equilibrium multi-community model that treats neighborhood compositions as endogenous.
However, it explores the potential of equilibrium sorting models in a new direction, analyzing locational equilibria in actual metropolitan areas. This gives rise to two differences relative to prior literature. In terms of the sorting model itself, we provide a very rich parameterization of household preferences, allowing the household location decision to be driven by a wide range of potentially relevant choice characteristics, including endogenous characteristics such as the race of one's neighbors -the rich data we have access to make this feasible. The model permits household preferences to vary in a very flexible way with observable household characteristics, so that households of different races can place a different valuation on having neighbors of a given race -a horizontal model is natural in this context. 6 Second, while prior work has typically used an analytic approach or relied on calibration of a few main parameters, we estimate a wide range of demand parameters directly using unusually detailed restricted Census microdata. These cover the entire San Francisco Bay Area, providing a wealth of household characteristics and detailed information on household locations and characteristics of neighbors. Our estimation approach draws on the notion of revealed preference: examining actual location decisions vary on average with household characteristics, one can learn how preferences for housing and neighborhood attributes vary with these characteristics. An important feature of our approach is that it accounts for an important endogeneity problem arising due to the correlation of neighborhood sociodemogaphics with unobserved housing and neighborhood quality. Among the rich array of preference estimates that we recover, it is clear that racial interactions in the utility function are powerful. 6 As noted in Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993) , there is an important tradeoff to be made between incorporating voting in multiple-community models on the one hand and abstracting from the political process entirely on the other. The inclusion of voting necessitates restrictions to be placed on preferences in order to ensure existence of an equilibrium. Important recent papers by Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) estimate equilibrium models that include voting over the level of public goods, restricting households to have shared rankings over a single public goods index. In this paper, we abstract from the political process to focus on racial segregation, a phenomenon that is primarily the product of decentralized location decisions made by heterogeneous households. Doing so allows us to specify preferences in a very flexible way. We also note that in a Californian context, state financing of education has left relatively little discretion over public goods determination at the local level.
In combination with these econometric estimates, our equilibrium sorting model provides a powerful tool for shedding new light on the causes and consequences of residential segregation in a general equilibrium setting. We address two hypotheses, prompted by a striking empirical observation: neighborhoods with both a high fraction of minority households and even moderate levels of income (and education) tend to be in relatively short supply in many metropolitan areasthis is readily apparent from Table 12 below. The short supply of such neighborhoods implies that a household's choice of neighborhood along other dimensions, including school quality, neighborhood income and education, is often tied together very explicitly with race. This has the effect of raising the implicit price that minority households pay for these neighborhood amenities, as consuming more of these neighborhood amenities typically requires living in a neighborhood with fewer minorities, while the opposite is typically true for white households. 7 Our first hypothesis, prompted by the short supply problem, relates to the causes of segregation. The previous literature universally suggests that an elimination of racial differences in income, wealth, or education would decrease segregation: we hypothesize that segregation could in fact increase once general equilibrium considerations are taken into account. In particular, as minority households move up the income distribution, the distribution of available neighborhoods will necessarily change. Because predominantly minority neighborhoods with even moderate income and education levels are in short supply in most metropolitan areas and would presumably be desirable to minority households, the increased formation of such neighborhoods could lead to increasing segregation among minorities, working against any segregation reduction due to the more even distribution of sociodemographic characteristics across race.
A natural way to address this hypothesis is to compare the current equilibrium and a new equilibrium in which racial differences in important socio-demographics have been eliminated.
We accomplish this using counterfactual simulations that shift many minority households up the income distribution and then calculate a new sorting equilibrium for the entire metropolitan area, allowing house prices to adjust and new types of neighborhood to form endogenouslydescriptive or partial equilibrium approaches have no adequate way of accounting for this kind of possibility. Our results indicate that the elimination of racial differences in income (or education) would lead to a moderate increase in the segregation of the high-income members of each major 7 The impact of the bundling of housing and neighborhood attributes in models of location choice is analyzed in Bayer (1999) . The importance of issue bundling in a political economy context has been studied in Besley and Coate (2001) . racial group in the Bay Area and to an increase in the overall segregation of Asian and Hispanic households. Partial equilibrium predictions of the model work in the opposite direction. 8
Our second hypothesis relates to the consequences of segregation. In contrast with the previous literature, which has emphasized the effects of living in a segregated neighborhood on various individual outcomes, we draw attention to the way that race alters residential location decisions in the first place. Accordingly, we advance the hypothesis that racial sorting in the housing market serves to lower the consumption of a wide variety of neighborhood amenities by minority households, pointing specifically to the implicit price mechanism described above. In particular, when the size of a minority population is relatively small and its members relatively poor on average, racial sorting in the housing market tends to raise the implicit price that households in this group face for neighborhood amenities, thereby leading to a reduction in their consumption.
We address this hypothesis by comparing the current equilibrium and a new equilibrium in which racial factors have been eliminated from the household choice process: a comparison of consumption patterns for households of different races and income levels in the current versus new equilibrium will then reveal whether consumption of neighborhood attributes is significantly affected. Our general equilibrium simulations provide the first evidence in the literature that sorting on the basis of race itself (whether driven by preferences directly or discrimination) leads to large reductions in the consumption of public safety and school quality by all black and Hispanic households and large reductions in the housing consumption of high-income black and Hispanic households. 9 These effects are likely to have a significant impact on the intergenerational persistence of racial differences in education, income, and wealth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the key feature of our San Francisco Bay Area dataset. Using these data, Section 3 provides evidence on the distribution of neighborhoods available in the housing market as well as the actual neighborhood 8 One concern with this counterfactual simulation is that it assumes the general structure of racial preferences would be unaffected by the elimination of racial differences in income or education. In practice, major changes in the distribution of income or education across race might affect racial preferences -for example, with more high-income blacks in a metropolitan area for example, segregating forces could be weakened. To address this concern, we provide additional evidence based on an analysis of segregation patterns across the 330 US metropolitan areas, the results indicating that the elimination of racial differences tends to increase segregation when there are many minority households. See Section 8 below. 9 We remain agnostic throughout this paper as to whether these interactions arise as the result of the preferences of each race for living with neighbors of the same race or discrimination in the housing market. While this distinction has important welfare implications, the point made here concerning the impact of racial interactions on the consumption of housing and neighborhood attributes remains regardless of which explanation prevails. We discuss this issue in greater detail below. choices that households in different race and income categories make. This descriptive evidence motivates our two hypotheses. Sections 4, 5 and 6 describe the main analytical tool used in this paper -an equilibrium model of residential sorting, describing the model, its estimation, and the estimated preference parameters in turn. Section 7 uses the estimated model to conduct a series of general equilibrium simulations that provide direct evidence on our central hypotheses.
Section 8 provides additional evidence using 2000 Census data from across metropolitan areas, and Section 9 concludes.
DATA
The main analysis conducted in this paper is facilitated by access to restricted Census microdata for 1990. These restricted Census data provide the detailed individual, household, and housing variables found i n the public -use version of the Census, but also include information on the location of individual residences and workplaces at a very disaggregate level. In particular, while the public -use data specify the PUMA (a Census region with approximately 100,000 individuals) in which a household lives, the restricted data specify the Census block (a Census region with approximately 100 individuals), thereby identifying the local neighborhood that each individual inhabits and the characteristics of each neighborhood far more accurately than has been previously possible with such a large-scale data set.
For our primary analysis, we use data from six contiguous counties in the San Francisco Bay Area: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, San Francisco, and Santa Clara. We focus on this area for two main reasons: because it is reasonably self-contained, and because the area is sizeable along a number of dimensions, including over 1,100 Census tracts, and almost 39,500
Census blocks, the smallest unit of aggregation in the data. The sample consists of just over 242,000 households.
The Census provides a wealth of data on the individuals in the sample -race, age, educational attainment, income from various sources, household size and structure, occupation, and employment location. 10 In addition, it provides a variety of housing characteristics: whether the unit is owned or rented, the corresponding rent or owner-reported value, 11 number of rooms, 10 Throughout our analysis , we treat the household as the decision-making agent and characterize each household's race as the race of the 'householder' -typically the household's primary earner. We assign households to one of four mutually exclusive categories of race/ethnicity: Hispanic, non-Hispanic Asian, non-Hispanic Black, and non-Hispanic White. 11 As described in the Data Appendix, we construct a single price vector for all houses, whether rented or owned. Because the implied relationship between house values and current rents depends on expectations about the growth rate of future rents in the market, we estimate a series of hedonic price regressions for each of over 40 sub-regions of the Bay Area housing market. These regressions return an estimate of the number of bedrooms, type of structure, and the age of the building. We use these housing characteristics directly and in constructing neighborhood characteristics, characterizing stock of housing in the neighborhood surrounding each house, as well as neighborhood racial, education and income distributions based on the households within the same Census block group, a Census region containing approximately 500 housing units. We merge additional data describing local conditions with each house record, constructing variables related to crime rates, land use, local schools, topography, and urban density. For each of these measures, a detailed description of the process by which the original data were assigned to each house is provided in a Data Appendix.
The list of the principal housing and neighborhood variables used in the analysis, along with means and standard deviations, is given in the first two columns of Table 1 .
NEIGHBORHOOD SEGREGATION AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNS
These detailed data for the San Francisco Bay Area help bring to light two striking aspects of neighborhood choice in the housing market equilibrium: there is a shortage of neighborhoods with both a high fraction of minorities and even moderate levels of neighborhood amenities; and minority households face a higher implicit price for such amenities than white households do.
Segregation Patterns. Before turning to these, we first describe the general pattern of segregation in the Bay Area by examining average racial exposure rates. These exposure rates characterize the average racial composition of the neighborhoods in which households in a particular sociodemographic category (e.g., high-income Asian households) reside; 12 throughout the portion of our analysis based on the Bay Area, we use Census block groups to define neighborhoods.
The top panel of Table 2 reports average racial exposure rates by race. The measures shown in the first column imply, for instance, that Asians in the Bay Area live in Census block groups that are on average 23 percent Asian, 7 percent black, 12 percent Hispanic, and 57 percent white. Comparing the racial exposure rates to the population of the Bay Area as a whole, a clear pattern emerges, with households of each race residing with households from the same race in proportions significantly higher than their proportions for the full Bay Area. The middle panel ratio of house values to rents for each of these sub-regions and we use the average of these ratios for the Bay Area, 264.1, to convert monthly rent to house value for the purposes of reporting results at the mean. 12 A variety of segregation measures are available, and while no single measure is perfect, we choose to work with the exposure rate measures because they are easy to interpret and can be decomposed in a variety of meaningful ways.
shows the pattern of exposure for the top and bottom income quartile of households of each race, along with the fraction of households in each race-income category. For example, the average exposure of blacks to other blacks declines from 49 percent for those in the lowest quartile of the income distribution to only 24 percent -still more than triple the fraction of blacks in the Bay Area as a whole.
The bottom panel of Table 2 makes clear that high-income minority households, and high-income blacks in particular, have a significant propensity to live with poorer households of the same race. It reports the average exposure of households in the top quartile of the overall income distribution for each race to households of the same race in each income quartile. The second row, for example, shows that blacks in the top quartile of the income distribution live on average in neighborhoods that consist of 9.8 percent blacks in the bottom quartile of the income distribution and 3.5 percent blacks in the top quartile. Thus blacks in the top income quartile are 'over-exposed' to blacks in the poorest quartile, living on average in neighborhoods with almost three times the fraction of these households in the Bay Area as a whole. 13 Neighborhood Choices. To motivate our two central hypotheses more directly, Tables 3 and 4 describe the distribution of neighborhoods in which households of each race in the top and bottom quartile of the income distribution reside, respectively. In each case, neighborhoods are ranked by the fraction of households of the same race, and deciles of the distribution are then reported. Focusing first on the second panel of Table 3 , which shows the distribution of neighborhoods in which high-income black households reside, the first column provides average household, housing, and neighborhood characteristics for the 10 percent of high-income black households that live in neighborhoods with the lowest fraction of black households, neighborhoods in which less than 2 percent of the population is black. As one reads across the columns, the neighborhoods have a larger fraction of black households by construction; the final column indicates that fully 10 percent of blacks in the top income quartile reside in neighborhoods in which over 76 percent of the population is black. Table 3 is the striking range of neighborhoods in which high-income blacks reside. Comparing the neighborhoods at either end of the spectrum, the levels of school quality, public safety, average neighborhood income, and fraction college-educated are each more than 2 standard deviations greater in the high-income neighborhoods versus the high-minority, low-income neighborhoods. The pattern for high-income Hispanics is remarkably similar to that for black households, as those neighborhoods with the highest fraction of Hispanics also possess substantially lower average incomes, less educated neighbors, worse schools and higher crime rates. For Asians, the pattern is qualitatively similar although much less marked, while for highincome white households, increases in the consumption of local public goods and other neighborhood socioeconomic measures are generally accompanied by an increase in the fraction of white neighbors.
What emerges from
The patterns shown in Table 3 are suggestive of two important aspects of neighborhood choice in the current Bay Area housing market equilibrium. First, the consumption of school quality, public safety, neighborhood income and education is strongly negatively correlated with the fraction of neighbors of the same race for black and Hispanic households. This suggests that these households are partially constrained in the current Bay Area equilibrium, being confronted by a shortage of minority neighborhoods with even moderate levels of desirable neighborhood attributes. 14 It is likely that an improvement in the availability of predominantly black and Hispanic neighborhoods with even moderate levels of average income would be very attractive to these households. This relates directly to our first hypothesis, as we would expect such neighborhoods to form more easily with an increase in the fractions of black and Hispanic households in the upper quartiles of the income distribution.
Second, while the increased consumption of neighborhood amenities comes at the expense of increased housing prices for high-income households of each race, these increases are accompanied by sharp decreases in the fraction of households of the same race for black and Hispanic households but increases in the fraction of households of the same race for whites.
Given segregating racial preferences (as we find below), this implies that black and Hispanic households face a price of consuming these neighborhood amenities that is implicitly higher than the price faced by white households. Thus if race were removed as a consideration in the location decision, along the lines of our second hypothesis, the implicit price that minority households would face in choosing neighborhoods with more neighborhood amenities would fall, leading them to choose neighborhoods more in line with those chosen by high-income black households living in predominantly white neighborhoods. 15 14 In the Bay Area in 2000, while predominantly Asian and white neighborhoods span the spectrum of average income levels, only six of the 659 tracts with income levels above that of the median tract, less than one percent, were more than 20 percent black. 15 The direct observation that, for instance, fully 30 percent of black households in the top income quartile, with income around $92,000, live in neighborhoods in which the average household income is less than $40,000 indicates that this is likely to be the case.
In a similar fashion, Table 4 reveals that black and Hispanic households in the bottom income quartile also face an implicit price of neighborhood amenities that exceeds the direct costs. While not as marked as for households in the top income quartile, the increased consumption of these neighborhood amenities is again accompanied by sharp decreases in the fraction of households of the same race for black and Hispanic households. Thus we anticipate that racial sorting in the housing market also raises the implicit price of neighborhood amenities for low-income black and Hispanic households, although perhaps not a starkly as for high-income
households.
An alternative potential explanation for the differences across the neighborhoods shown in Tables 3 and 4 is that, within each of these race-income quartile groups, households have heterogeneous demands for neighborhood characteristics and socioeconomics. This is certainly part of the story. 16 However, a proper test requires one to control directly household sorting on the basis of other factors such as income, wealth, education, household structure, and employment locations. To this end, we now describe a model of residential sorting that explicitly incorporates these factors.
A MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SORTING
This section sets out the principal analytical tool that we use to explore segregation as a general equilibrium phenomenon -an equilibrium model of a self-contained urban housing market in which households sort themselves among the set of available housing types and locations. The model consists of two key elements: the household residential location decision problem and a market-clearing condition. While it has a simple structure, the model allows households to have heterogeneous preferences defined over housing and neighborhood attributes in a very flexible way; it also allows for housing prices and neighborhood sociodemographic compositions to be determined in equilibrium. We estimate this model using rich individual data, appealing to the notion of revealed preference -specifically that the residential location decision reveals preferences for a wide range of housing and neighborhood attributes. By examining how location decisions vary, on average, with household characteristics such as income, education, and race, one can learn how preferences for the housing and neighborhood attributes vary with these sociodemographic characteristics. Once the broad set of preference parameters in the model have been estimated, 16 For instance, the average income of the high-income black households that reside in the neighborhoods with the fewest black households is in fact larger ($112,000 on average) than for those that reside in the neighborhoods with the highest fraction of blacks ($91,000).
we then use the estimates and the equilibrium model to conduct a series of general equilibrium simulations designed to shed new light on the causes and consequences of segregation.
The Residential Location Decision. We model the residential location decision of each household as a discrete choice of a single residence from a set of houses available in the market.
The utility function specification is based on the random utility model developed in McFadden (1973, 1978) and the specification of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) , which includes choicespecific unobservable characteristics. 17 Let X h represent the observable characteristics of housing choice h including characteristics of the house itself (e.g., size, age, and type), its tenure status (rented vs. owned), and the characteristics of its neighborhood (e.g., school, crime, and topography). We use the notation Z to represent the average sociodemographic characteristics of the corresponding neighborhood, writing it separately from the other housing and neighborhood attributes to make explicit the fact that these characteristics are determined in equilibrium. 18 Let p h denote the price of housing choice h and, finally, let d h i denote the distance from residence h to the primary work location of household i. Each household chooses its residence h to maximize its indirect utility function V h i :
(1)
The error structure of the indirect utility is divided into a correlated component associated with each house that is valued the same by all households, ξ h , and an individual-specific term, ε i h . A useful interpretation of ξ h is that it captures the unobserved quality of each house, including any unobserved quality associated with its neighborhood. 19 Each household's valuation of choice characteristics is allowed to vary with its own characteristics, Z i , including education, income, race, employment status, and household composition.
Specifically, each parameter associated with housing and neighborhood characteristics and price, α i j , for j ∈ {X, Z , d, p}, varies with a household's own characteristics according to: 17 Discrete choice applications in the urban economics literature include Anas (1982) , Quigley (1985) , Gabriel and Rosenthal (1989) , Nechyba and Strauss (1998) , Bajari and Kahn (2001) . Only the latter paper includes choice-specific unobservables. Brock and Durlauf (2001) discrete choice models with social interactions. 18 This component of the utility function allows for endogenous sorting on the basis of race, as in Schelling (1969 Schelling ( , 1971 , as well as other characteristics such as income and education. 19 We employ an indirect utility function that is linear in housing prices. Alternative specifications of the indirect utility function could certainly be estimated, as the linear form is not essential to the model.
(2)
with equation (2) describing household i's preference for choice characteristic j.
Characterizing the Housing Market. As with all models in this literature, the existence of a sorting equilibrium is much easier to e stablish if the individual residential location decision problem is smoothed in some way. To this end, we assume that the housing market can be fully characterized by a set of housing types that is a subset of the full set of available houses, letting the supply of housing of type h be given by S h . 20
Given the household's problem described in equations (1)-(2), household i chooses housing type h if the utility that it receives from this choice exceeds the utility that it receives from all other possible house choices -that is, when
where W i h includes all of the non-idiosyncratic components of the utility function V i h . As the inequalities in (3) imply, the probability that a household chooses any particular choice depends in general on the characteristics of the full set of possible house types. Thus the probability P i h that household i chooses housing type h can be written as a function of the full vectors of house/neighborhood characteristics (both observed and unobserved) and prices {X, p, ξ ξ }:
as well as the household's own characteristics Z i .
Aggregating the probabilities in equation (4) over all observed households yields the predicted demand for each housing type h, D h :
In order for the housing market to clear, the demand for houses of type h must equal the supply of such houses and so:
Given the decentralized nature of the housing market, prices are assumed to adjust in order to clear the market. The implications of the market clearing condition defined in equation (6) for 20 We also assume that each household observed in the sample represents a continuum of households with the same observable characteristics, with the distribution of idiosyncratic tastes ε i h mapping into a set of choice probabilities that characterize the distribution of housing choices that would result for the continuum of households with a given set of observed characteristics. For expositional ease and without loss of generality, we assume that the measure of this continuum is one. prices are very standard, with excess demand for a housing type causing price to be bid up and excess supply leading to a fall in price. Given the indirect utility function defined in (1) and a fixed set of housing and neighborhood attributes, Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004b) show that a unique set of prices (up to scale) clears the market.
When some neighborhood attributes are endogenously determined by the sorting process itself, we define a sorting equilibrium as a set of residential location decisions and a vector of housing prices such that the housing market clears and each household makes its optimal location decision given the location decisions of all other households. In equilibrium, the vector of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics along with the corresponding vector of market clearing prices must give rise to choice probabilities that aggregate back up to the same vector of neighborhood sociodemographics. 21
Whether this model gives rise to multiple equilibria depends on the distributions of preferences and available housing choices as well as the utility parameters. 22 In general, it is impossible to establish that the equilibrium is unique a priori. Fortunately, estimation of the model does not require the computation of an equilibrium nor uniqueness more generally, as we describe in the next section. Thus, the primary place where the issue of whether the equilibrium is unique arises is in conducting counterfactual simulations and we discuss this issue in Section 7 below.
ESTIMATION
Estimation of the model follows a two-step procedure related to that developed in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) . A rigorous presentation of the estimation procedure, including a discussion of methods for simplifying the computation and a description of the asymptotic properties of the estimator, is included in a technical appendix. In this section, we outline the estimation procedure, focusing on identification of the model. It is helpful in describing the estimation procedure to first introduce some notation. In particular, we rewrite the indirect utility function as:
In equation (8), δ h captures the portion of utility provided by housing type h that is common to all households, and in (9) 
Maximizing the probability that each household makes its correct housing choice gives rise to the following log-likelihood function:
h is an indicator variable that equals 1 if household i chooses house type h in the data and 0 otherwise. The first step of the estimation procedure consists of searching over the parameters in λ and the vector of mean indirect utilities to maximize l .
The Endogeneity of Neighborhood Sociodemographic Composition. Having estimated the vector of mean indirect utilities in the first stage of the estimation, the second stage of the estimation involves decomposing δ δ into observable and unobservable components according to the regression equation (8). 24 In estimating equation (8), important endogeneity problems need to be confronted. To the extent that house prices partly capture house and neighborhood quality unobserved to the econometrician, so the price variable will be endogenous. Estimation via least squares will thus lead to price coefficients biased towards zero, producing misleading willingness-to-pay estimates for a whole range of choice characteristics. This issue arises in the context of any differentiated products demand estimation and we describe the construction of an instrument for price in the Technical Appendix.
A second identification issue concerns the correlation of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics in Z (which includes neighborhood race, income and education, as well as school quality) with unobserved housing and neighborhood quality, ξ h -a correlation that is mechanical given the sorting of households across locations. To properly estimate preferences in the face of this endogeneity problem, we adapt a technique previously developed by Black (1999) when estimating preferences for school quality. Black's strategy makes use of a sample of houses near school attendance zone boundaries, estimating a hedonic price regression that includes boundary fixed effects. Intuitively, the idea is to compare houses in the same local neighborhood but on opposite sides of the boundary, exploiting the discontinuity in the right to attend a given school.
For our purposes, boundary fixed effects are likely absorb out differences in many fixed housing and neighborhood attributes, including ones that are unobservable. 25 To the extent that sorting with respect to the school district boundaries that we use is driven by differences in school quality and neighborhood sociodemographics themselves, the use of boundary fixed effects isolates 24 Notice that the set of observed residential choices provides no information that distinguishes the components of δ δ . That is, however δ δ is broken into components, the effect on the probabilities shown in equation (10) is identical. 25 A number of empirical issues arise in incorporating boundary fixed effects into our analysis. Concerning the choice of jurisdiction for which the boundaries are defined, we use boundaries between school districts in the Bay Area. A central feature of local governance in California helps to eliminate some of the problems that naturally arise with the use of school district boundaries, as Proposition 13 ensures that the vast majority of school districts within California are subject to a uniform effective property tax rate of one percent. Concerning the width of the boundaries, we experimented with a variety of distances and report the results for 0.25 miles, as these were more precise due to the larger sample size. variation in neighborhood sociodemographics that is uncorrelated with variation in unobserved housing and neighborhood quality. Thus, it provides an appealing way to account for the correlation of school quality with unobservable neighborhood quality as well as the correlation of neighborhood sociodemographics with unobservable neighborhood quality. Column 7 of Table 1 shows the resulting weighted means, showing that using these weights makes the sample near the boundary much more representative of the full sample, column 7 typically being much closer to column 1 than column 3 is.
Comparing differences across school district boundaries, displayed in columns 4 and 5, the average characteristics of houses with 0.25 miles of the boundary on the high school quality versus low school quality side of each boundary reveals that houses on the high side cost $53 more per month and are assigned to schools with a 43-point average test score increase. 28 Houses on the high quality side of the boundary are more likely to be inhabited by white households and households with more education and income -this pattern is evident when looking at the difference in means test. These types of across-boundary differences in sociodemographic composition are what one would expect if households sort on the basis of preferences for school quality, thereby leading those with stronger tastes or increased ability to pay for school quality to choose the higher school quality side of the boundary.
Racial Preferences and Discrimination. The strategy of using boundary fixed effects is designed to deal with the correlation of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics with any unobserved component of neighborhood quality valued the same by households of all races. It is 26 In addition, the fourth and fifth columns report means on the high versus low average test score side of the school district boundary; the sixth column reports t-tests for difference in means of fourth and fifth columns; and the seventh column reports weighted means for the sample of houses within 0.25 miles of a school district boundary -the weight is described below. 27 The following procedure is used: we first regress a dummy variable indicating whether a house is in a boundary region on the vector of housing and neighborhood attributes using a logistic regression. Fitted values from this regression provide an estimate of the likelihood that a house is in the boundary region given its attributes. We use the inverse of this fitted value as a sample weight in subsequent regression analysis conducted on the sample of houses near the boundary. important to point out, however, that this strategy does not help us distinguish the extent to which these estimated racial interactions result from (i) discrimination in the housing market (e.g., centralized discrimination against recent immigrants from China), (ii) direct preferences for the race of one's neighbors (e.g., preferences on the part of a recent immigrant from China to live with other Chinese immigrants), and (iii) preferences for race-specific portions of unobserved neighborhood quality (e.g., preferences for Chinese groceries which are located in neighborhoods with a high fraction of Chinese residents). That is, these underlying explanations are indistinguishable from one another because they give rise to predicted residential location decisions that are observationally equivalent in the data.
Regardless of whether the sizes of the parameters that multiply the interactions of household race and neighborhood racial composition result from preferences or discrimination, these parameters do inform us about the importance of sorting on the basis of race in the housing market. If one thinks of discrimination as an expression of the preferences of the discriminating group concerning the group discriminated against, then our model essentially misassigns these preferences to the group discriminated against. Thus, while our estimate of the preferences of black households to live with other black households may be overstated, the difference between the preferences of white versus black households to live with black households remains informative. Because it is the differences in estimated preferences that drive the equilibrium predictions of the model, our inability to distinguish centralized discrimination from decentralized preferences does not seriously affect a key aim of our simulations, namely to gauge the impact of racial factors as a whole on the housing market equilibrium.
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Estimation of the full model proceeds in two stages, as noted, the first stage recovering interaction parameters and vector of mean indirect utilities, the second stage returning the components of mean indirect utility. We report the estimates of the interaction parameters in Appendix Table 1 . As the table demonstrates, the first stage of the estimation procedure returns 165 parameters on terms that interact individual and household characteristics, permitting great flexibility in preferences across different types of households. In particular, the model includes the following household characteristics: total household income, household income from capital sources (a proxy for wealth), race, education, work status, age, the presence of children, and, importantly, interactions of household income and race. These household characteristics are interacted with many h ousing and neighborhood attributes including house price, owneroccupancy status, 29 number of rooms, the age of the structure, average test score, elevation, population density, crime and eight variables characterizing the neighborhood sociodemographic composition: the fraction of households of each race, the fraction of households college educated, average neighborhood income, and neighborhood income interacted with race. The model also captures the spatial aspect of the housing market by allowing households to have preferences over commuting distance. 30 This specification is especially flexible from the point of view of the main research questions addressed in the paper, in two key ways. First, it includes a full set of race interactions permitting, for example, black households to have different preferences for Asian versus white neighbors. Second, it includes interactions of race and income both as household and neighborhood characteristics, thereby permitting high-income Asian households, for example , to have different preferences than low-income Asian households for neighborhoods and for these preferences to depend on whether a neighborhood has high-versus low-income Asian neighbors.
The numbers in Appendix Table 1 are not directly interpretable in dollar values and so we discuss the results in terms of marginal willingness-to-pay measures (MWTP); the results for the mean household are shown in Table 5 and results related to heterogeneity in MWTP are shown in Table 6 . The first three columns of Table 5 reports the implied measures of the mean MWTP for housing and neighborhood attributes that result for three specifications of the mean indirect utility regressions. These measures are calculated by dividing the coefficient associated with each choice characteristic in these regressions by the coefficient on price.
Results are reported for the full sample and for a sample of houses within 0.25 miles of school district boundaries, with and without including fixed effects. No clear changes emerge when the sample is reduced to only those houses near a school district boundary. Comparing the coefficients on the neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics with and without the inclusion of boundary fixed effects (columns 2 and 3) yields the pattern of results one would expect if the boundary fixed effects control for unobserved components neighborhood quality unrelated to the 29 We treat ownership status as a fixed feature of a housing unit in the analysis. Thus, whether a household rents or owns is endogenously determined within the model by its house choice. In the model, we allow households to have heterogeneous preferences for home-ownership (a positive interaction between household wealth and ownership, for example, will imply that wealthier households are more likely to own their housing unit, as we find below). A single price index is used for owner-and renter-occupied unitssee the Data Appendix for details. 30 We treat a household's primary work location as exogenous, calculating the distance from this location to the location of the neighborhood in question. Estimates based on a specification without commuting distance are qualitatively similar. sorting of households across the boundary. 31 Thus boundary fixed effects seem to be effective in controlling for fixed aspects of unobserved neighborhood quality that are correlated with neighborhood sociodemographics, and thus provide an attractive way of estimating preferences for neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics in the presence of this important endogeneity problem. 32 Table 6 reports the implied estimates of the heterogeneity in MWTP for selected housing and neighborhood characteristics for the specification associated with column (3) in Table 5 , which includes boundary fixed effects. This is our preferred specification. The first row of Table   6 repeats the MWTP of the mean household and then reports the MWTP for households with the characteristic listed in the row heading, holding all other characteristics at the mean. The table reveals strong segregating racial interactions, with households of each race preferring to live near others of the same race. Interpreted literally as preferences, black households with income equal to the mean ($55,000), for example, are willing to pay $67 per month on average to live i n a neighborhood with 10 percent more black versus white households. White households with mean income, on the other hand, are willing to pay $38 per month on average to live in a neighborhood that is 10 percent more white versus black. 33 Hispanic and Asian households with mean incomes are willing to pay $98 and $72 per month, respectively, to live with others of the same race versus whites. Importantly, the equilibrium predictions of the model concerning segregation patterns are driven by the differences in preferences across households of different races (as discussed above, this is in essence what makes it impossible to distinguish preferences from discrimination in observational data). Looking at the difference between what whites versus households in the other race categories are willing to pay for these changes, Asian-White and Black-White differences come to over $100 per month for a 10 percent change, while Hispanic -White differences amount to $70 per month. Table 6 also shows similar figures calc ulated for households at a higher income level (income=$120,000) in this case Asian-White, In particular, controlling for fixed effects increases the coefficient on percent black (reported at the mean average neighborhood income) from -$285 to -$234; on percent Hispanic from -$37 to $104; and on percent Asian from -$70 to $150. Doing so also reduces the coefficient on the percent of households with a college degree from $186 to $165 and the coefficient on average neighborhood income (/$10,000) from $89 to $85 per month. 32 Comparison of our parameter estimates with analogous hedonic price regressions provides further support for their plausibility. We carry out this comparison in a brief Hedonics Appendix. 33 We discuss the implications of centralized discrimination in the housing market for the interpretation of these estimates in the Hedonics Appendix below. and Hispanic -White differences each remain near $90 per month. Thus, strong segregating forces in the housing market are relevant at all income levels. 34
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM SIMULATIONS
We now use the estimated parameters to conduct a series of general equilibrium simulations designed to shed new light on the causes and consequences of segregation. Each simulation begins by changing a key primitive of the model and then calculating a new equilibrium for the model in this counterfactual environment.
The basic structure of the simulations consists of a loop within a loop. The outer loop calculates the sociodemographic composition of each neighborhood, given a set of prices and an initial sociodemographic composition of each neighborhood. The inner loop calculates the unique set of prices that clears the housing market, given an initial sociodemographic composition for each neighborhood. Thus for any change in the primitives of the model, we first calculate a new set of prices that clears the market; as discussed in Section 4, Berry (1994) ensures that there is a unique set of market clearing prices. Using these new prices and the initial sociodemographic composition of each neighborhood, we then calculate the probability that each household chooses each housing type, and aggregating these choices to the neighborhood level, calculate the predicted sociodemographic composition of each neighborhood. We then replace the initial neighborhood sociodemographic measures with these new measures and start the loop again -i.e., calculate a new set of market clearing prices with these updated neighborhood sociodemographic measures. We continue this process until the neighborhood sociodemographic measures converge. The set of household location decisions corresponding to these new measures along with the vector of housing prices that clears the market then represents the new equilibrium. 35
Adjusting Crime Rates and Average Test Scores. Because some neighborhood amenities, such as crime rates and school quality, depend in part on the sociodemographic composition of the 34 The strong segregating racial interactions that we estimate are in no way implicitly assumed in writing down the model. As is clear from Table 6, households of every income level prefer to live with higher income neighbors. This makes clear that the model does not in any way force the parameters to yield segregating preferences (i.e., preferences for others like oneself), as both high-and low-income households are willing to pay for higher income neighbors. neighborhood, it is natural to expect these neighborhood characteristics to adjust as part of the movement to a new sorting equilibrium. 36 Accounting for the impact of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics on crime rates and test scores is a challenging exercise, as selection problems abound. For example, an OLS regression of crime rates on neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics almost certainly overstates the role of these characteristics in producing crime as it ignores the fact that households sort non-randomly across neighborhoods.
In the light of these difficulties, we adopt an approach that seeks to provide simple bounds for the characteristics of the new equilibrium that results for each of our simulations. For one bound, we calculate a new equilibrium without allowing crime rates and average test scores in each neighborhood to adjust. For the other bound, we calculate a new equilibrium, adjusting crime rates and average test scores in each neighborhood according the adjustments implied by an OLS regression of the crime rate and average test score on neighborhood sociodemographic composition. The first bound will tend to understate the impact of sociodemographic shifts on the implied crime rate and average test score in each neighborhood, while the second bound will tend to overstate the impact of these sociodemographic shifts. As the results below indicate, these bounds provide a reasonable range for the predictions from our simulations. 37
Eliminating Racial Interactions in the Location Decision. We first consider the general equilibrium predictions of counterfactual simulations that eliminate all racial interactions in the location decision -that is, setting all of the utility parameters that govern preferences for neighborhood racial characteristics (including interactions of neighborhood race and neighborhood income) to zero. Table 7 reports the exposure rate measures that arise with the elimination of racial interactions. Not surprisingly, the elimination of racial interactions has an enormous effect in reducing segregation, completely eliminating segregation except for a small portion for black households. 36 Such adjustments may arise due to effects that operate through the political system, as in Tiebout (1956) , or as the result of productive externalities. The former effects are likely to be limited in our analysis due to nature of the provision of public goods in California, which gives local governments almost no control over taxes or the level of spending. 37 It is also important to point out that because the model itself does not perfectly predict the housing choices that individuals make, the neighborhood sociodemographic measures initially predicted by model, PREDICT n Z , will not match the actual sociodemographic characteristics of each neighborhood, ACTUAL n Z .
Consequently, before calculating the new equilibrium for any simulation, we first solve for the initial prediction error associated with each neighborhood n: PREDICT n ACTUAL n n Z Z − = ω . We add this initial prediction error ω n to the sociodemographic measures calculated in each iteration before substituting these measures back into the utility function.
The elimination of racial interactions in the location decision also has important consequences for the consumption of households of each race. Table 8 reports a number of consumption measures before and after the simulation, the rows of the table reporting the homeownership rate, average monthly house price, average commuting distance, and the average consumption of house size, school quality, crime, neighborhood income and education for each racia l group. 38 The most striking results for this simulation pertain to the consumption of local public goods. In this case, the black-white gap in school quality consumption is reduced by 55%-65% and the Hispanic -white gap by 65-66%. Likewise, the black-white gap in exposure to crime is reduced by 55%-65% and the Hispanic -white gap is reduced by 84-85%. Again, the ranges for these estimates reflect the results of two simulations that differ in the manner school quality and crime are adjusted with the changing neighborhood sociodemographic composition. The striking feature of these results is that substantial reductions in racial differences in consumption come about simply by eliminating racial interactions in the housing market -that is, without changing household income, wealth, education, etc.
To provide more perspective on these results, Table 9 breaks out the results of Table 8 by income, reporting results for households in the top and bottom quartiles of the income distribution. Focusing on the results for black households, these numbers reveal that black households in the top income quartile experience increased consumption of every type of neighborhood and housing amenity, including house size and home ownership. Black households in the bottom income quartile also experience increased consumption of each neighborhood amenity, but actually experience a decline in housing consumption. Importantly, black households at all income levels also spend a considerable amount more on housing in the new equilibrium in which sorting for race-related reasons has been eliminated.
These results imply that race plays a profound role in shaping the equilibrium matching of households to neighborhoods in an urban housing market. As the consumption patterns of Tables 3 and 4 have already suggested, because black households make up only about 8 percent of the population of the Bay Area, consumption decisions regarding neighborhood race and other neighborhood amenities are not separable; increases in these other neighborhood amenities typically mean a decline in the fraction of racial minorities in a neighborhood. This affects the implicit price that blacks versus whites pay for neighborhood amenities, thereby accentuating racial differences in consumption. This point is underscored by the fact that black households spend a good deal more on housing in the new equilibrium in which race-related reasons for sorting have been eliminated compared with the initial equilibrium.
Taken together, the results of Table 9 imply t hat racial sorting in the housing market serves to accentuate racial differences in the consumption of neighborhood goods throughout the income distribution. While racial differences in income, wealth, and education would give rise to differences in the consumption of neighborhood amenities even in the absence of racial sorting, as can be seen in the consumption figures for the new equilibrium, racial sorting tends to widen these underlying differences, leading to even lower levels of consumption though at cheaper housing prices for black households. While the corresponding changes in housing prices make the welfare implications of this lower consumption unclear, these results imply that racial sorting in the housing market works in general to strengthen the persistence of intergenerational racial differences in educational attainment, income, and wealth.
Eliminating Racial Differences in Income and Wealth. We next consider the impact of eliminating racial differences in both non-capital income and capital income, which we assume throughout this discussion to be a good proxy for household wealth. 39 Operationally, we do this by assigning to a household at the p th percentile of the income distribution within its own race the income and wealth (capital income) of the p th percentile household in the income distribution of the Bay Area as a whole. This method equalizes income and wealth across races and has the advantage of preserving income rank within race. Table 10 summarizes the impact of this change on segregation patterns, reporting three sets of exposure rate measures. Panel A reports the measures based on data for the full sample, while Panels B-D report the partial and general equilibrium predictions. 40 The partial equilibrium predictions of the model imply a reduction in segregation of 13-22% for black, Hispanic, and white households (as measured by the over-exposure to households of the same race) and of 4% for Asian households. These predictions mirror those generally found in the previous literature, which indicate that differences in income explain only a modest amount of the observed pattern of racial segregation. 41 In essence, the partial equilibrium predictions reflect the fact that 39 Note that even though we do not control directly for property wealth in our analysis, the estimated coefficients associated with income form capital sources will do a good job of capturing a wealth effect as long as property and non-property wealth are sufficiently correlated. 40 As described above, it is important to note that measurement error is built into the measures reported in Panels B and C to reflect the fact that the model does not perfectly predict actual neighborhood sociodemographic compositions. Thus, the results presented in these three panels are directly comparable to one another. 41 See, for example, Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004a) and, for a more complete summary of results, Massey and Denton (1993) . eliminating racial differences in income and wealth leads to more similar demands for housing and neighborhood attributes across race. The partial equilibrium predictions do not move even further in the direction of reducing segregation primarily because racial interactions in the housing market dampen the propensity of high-income black and Hispanic household to move into houses in what had been high-income neighborhoods with high fractions of white households.
The general equilibrium predictions of the model imply a significant increase in the segregation of Asian and Hispanic households, increasing the over-exposure of households of each race to households of the same race by 15-20 percent. Moreover, the general equilibrium predictions imply a reduction in segregation of only 5 -9 percent for black households (as measured by the over-exposure to households of the same race). Thus, in direct contrast to the previous literature, our results imply that segregation may very well increase with the elimination of racial differences in important sociodemographic characteristics. Importantly, it is the fact that our model allows for the set of neighborhoods themselves to change that is critical. The partial equilibrium approaches previous used in the literature essentially constrain their analyses to imply that reducing racial differences in socioeconomic characteristics would reduce segregation.
To provide a fuller picture of the impact of eliminating racial differences in income and wealth, Table 11 reports a series of consumption measures for households in the top and bottom quartiles of the income distribution, analogous to those reported in Table 9 for our previous counterfactual simulation. In essence, this simulation puts each race on equal footing in terms of ability to pay for housing and neighborhood attributes, leaving any race-related reasons for sorting in place. As Table 10 makes clear, these strong segregating preferences continue to lead to substantial amounts of racial segregation, but the implications of racial sorting for consumption are very different when households of each race have equal versus unequal spending power. In particular, in the new equilibrium described in Table 11 , while blacks in each income quartile continue to consume slightly lower levels of neighborhood amenities, (school q uality, public safety, etc.), they also consume higher levels of housing amenities, home-ownership and house size than whites. More generally, while there is variation in the types of houses and neighborhoods chosen by each race, there is very little variation in the total amount spent on housing. In this way, racial sorting in a world with equal spending power likely continues to accentuate underlying differences in preferences across race, due to the small numbers of Asians, blacks, and Hispanics in the population. As the previous simulation demonstrates, however, in a world without equal spending power, racial sorting works to widen differences that arise initially due to differences in the ability to pay, thereby potentially greatly slowing and perhaps even preventing racial convergence in education, income, and wealth over time.
LOOKING ACROSS METROPOLITAN AREAS
The general equilibrium approach that forms the basis for the main analysis presented in this paper has two potential limitations. First, the analysis has been conducted for a single metropolitan area, which brings into question whether the population and neighborhoods of this metropolitan area are sufficiently representative of those in other metropolitan areas. This is a particular concern to the extent that the process through neighborhood compositions adjust with an equalization of important sociodemographic characteristics may be a function of the underlying sizes of minority population in the metro area. Second, the counterfactual simulations hold the general structure of racial preferences unchanged by the elimination of racial differences in income or education. While we are careful to allow preferences to vary distinctly by race and income categories, it is still possible that major changes in the distribution of income or education across race might affect preferences.
To address these potential shortcomings, we provide additional descriptive evidence based on an analysis of segregation patterns across the 330 US metropolitan areas for the year 2000. First, we demonstrate that the short supply of neighborhoods with even moderate education levels and a high fraction of minority households is a general feature of metropolitan areas throughout the United States. We then examine how segregation patterns vary with the sociodemographic composition of a metropolitan area. The resulting regressions provide evidence that, in many instances, overall segregation and especially the segregation of highlyeducated households of a given race are increasing in the education level of that race.
The data used in this section were compiled from the Summary Files that provide information on the distribution of education by race for each Census tract for the year 2000. 42 As before, households are assigned to one of four mutually exclusive categories of race/ethnicity on the basis of the race/ethnicity of the householder. 43 We then construct exposure rate measures for 42 It would obviously have been preferable to use information on the joint distribution of race and income rather than education to make the results most comparable to those presented above. Unfortunately, the corresponding Census data, which we downloaded at the time of writing, had clear and serious errors. Also, Census tracts versus block groups are used in this portion of the analysis as that is the level at which the joint distribution of education and race is available in the Census Summary files. 43 The vast majority of households that checked two races can be characterized as either Hispanic of non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander. Other households that checked two or more races, a very small fraction overall, were dropped from this analysis. a variety of race and education categories for each US primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA). Table 12 documents the number of tracts in the United States by the percentage of households with a college degree and the percentage of households that are black. 44 The first row describes the number of tracts in which more than 0, 20, 40, 60, and 80 percent of head of households are college-educated, respectively. The subsequent rows report the number of tracts in each of these categories with increasing fractions of black households. As the table shows, a much smaller fraction of the tracts with a high fraction of black households have a high fraction of households with a college degree. For example, while 23 percent of all tracts are at least 40 percent college educated, only 2.5 percent of tracts that are at least 40 percent black are at least 40 percent college educated, and only 1.1 percent of tracts that are at least 60 percent black are at least 40 percent college educated. 45 The lower panel of Table 12 shows the locations of the tracts in the US that contain both a high fraction of black and a high fraction of college-educated households. It makes clear that the availability of neighborhoods containing a high fraction of both black and highly-educated households is extremely limited outside a handful of metro areas throughout the US. Of the 44 tracts (less than 0.1 percent of all tracts) that are at least 60 percent black and 40 percent collegeeducated, 13 are in the Washington, DC PMSA, 8 in Detroit, 6 in Los Angeles, and 5 in Atlanta.
The upper panel of
Thus, almost 75 percent of these tracts can be found in one of only four PMSAs. Of the 142 tracts that are at least 40 percent black and 40 percent college-educated, almost two-thirds are in the PMSAs listed above as well as Chicago and New York.
To explore the effect of a metropolitan area's population on segregation itself, Table 13 reports the results of a series of 27 regressions that relate measures of own-race exposure to the underlying sociodemographic characteristics of the metropolitan area for black, Asian, and Hispanic households, respectively. For each race, we report results for three exposure measures: the average exposure of (i) all, (ii) college-educated, and (iii) non-college-educated households of this race to others of the same race. Results are reported for samples based on all PMSAs and PMSAs where the fraction of the given race is above the median, and twice the median, respectively. In these regressions, a coefficient greater than one implies that the segregation of the group in question increases with an increase in the given population, while coefficients less than one imply a decrease. Consequently, we denote coefficients that are statistically different 44 In the interest of brevity, we limit the description of neighborhood in Table 12 to black households. Comparable tables are available upon request for the other races/ethnicities. 45 In this sample, 47 percent of Asian, 16 percent of black, 14 percent of Hispanic, and 33 percent of white householders have a 4-year college degree. from one rather than zero. We also report the results of a test of the hypothesis that an increase in the fraction of households of a given race that are college-educated has no effect on the own-race exposure of households in the associated education category. 46 This test reveals whether segregation is an increasing or decreasing function of the average education level of the race in question.
Focusing first on black households, the descriptive patterns presented in Table 13 imply that segregation of both college-and non-college-educated black households is increasing at a similar (and greater than one-to-one rate) in both the fraction of college-and non-collegeeducated black households in the PMSA. Thus, in general, an increase in the average education level of black households in a PMSA has no effect on the level of black segregation. In PMSAs in which at least 12.5 percent of the population is black, on the other hand, the regression coefficients imply that black segregation is increasing in the average education level of blacks in the PMSA. Taken together, the results suggest that an increase in black education levels is likely to have opposite effects on black segregation depending on whether the overall size of the population is large (increasing) versus small (decreasing). Interestingly, the fraction of households in the San Francisco Bay Area falls fairly close to the median fraction and, consequently, the analysis presented here would likely suggest that an increase in black education would have very little impact on black segregation, which is what our simulations reveal.
The results for Asian households imply that Asian segregation is an increasing function of the average education level of Asians in the metropolitan area, no matter how large the Asian population is (although one should note that very few metropolitan areas have a significant fraction of Asians). The results for Hispanic households imply that the segregation of collegeeducated Hispanics is an increasing function of the average education level of Hispanics in the metropolitan area. 47
It is important to recognize that the analysis presented in Table 13 is descriptive. With around 300 observations, it is impossible to control properly for other factors that differ across metropolitan areas, especially if one considers that the effect of education on segregation may vary according to the size of the minority population in the metropolitan area. Moreover, these regressions do not control in any way for potential differences in the individuals of a given race 46 The appropriate test in this case is to compare the coefficient on the fraction of the PMSA that is of the corresponding race with a college degree to the coefficient on the fraction of the PMSA that is of the corresponding race without a college degree. 47 The segregation of Hispanics households without a college degree, on the other hand, is a decreasing function of the average education level of Hispanics in the PMSA. Because Hispanic households without a college-degree represent over 85 percent of the population, overall Hispanic segregation is also generally a decreasing function of education. that reside in metropolitan areas with a high versus low fraction of others of the same race. 48 That said, the resulting regressions suggest that, in many instances, overall segregation and especially the segregation of highly-educated households of a given race is an increasing function of the education l evel of that race. This possibility has been largely ignored by the previous literature, which has typically taken a more partial equilibrium view of the problem. Given the limitations of the across-metropolitan area analysis of the type used here, a fruitful direction for future research would be to apply the general equilibrium analysis developed in this paper to metropolitan areas throughout the country with different underlying populations.
CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the causes and consequences of residential segregation from a new general equilibrium perspective, one that recognizes that the types of neighborhoods available in a metropolitan housing market are endogenously determined, governed by the characteristics and preferences of households that reside in the metropolitan area. The paper has advanced two new hypotheses regarding the causes and consequences of segregation. According to the first, eliminating differences in income, wealth, or education across race would be unlikely to reduce segregation significantly, and could actually increase segregation as new minority neighborhoods form. According to the second, racial sorting in the housing market serves to lower the consumption of neighborhood amenities by minority households, especially those with moderate to high incomes.
Both hypotheses are motivated by the empirical regularity that in many US cities, neighborhoods combining a high fraction of minority households and even moderate levels of average income and education are in short supply. This has the effect of raising the implicit price that minority households pay for school quality, public safety, neighborhood education and income, given that in order to consume more of these other important neighborhood attributes, households are typically required to live in a neighborhood with fewer minorities. In turn, many high-income minority households live in neighborhoods with high fractions of other households 48 If one ranks PMSAs by the difference between the own-race exposure of Asian households and the fraction of Asians in the PMSA (i.e., the 'over-exposure' of Asians to one another), the following PMSAs are in the Top 10: Lafayette, IN (1); Bloomington, IN (3); Champaign, IL (6); State College, PA (7); Ann Arbor, MI (8); Lansing-East Lansing, MI (9); Lexington, KY (10), all university towns in the Midwest. This list highlight the concern with the types of regressions reported in Table 13 , namely that the individuals of each race that live in metropolitan areas with, for example, a high fraction of collegeeducated members of that race may be systematically different than those who live in metro areas with a smaller fraction.
of the same race, giving up substantial amounts of consumption of local public goods and average neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics to do so.
The primary evidence that we present relating to these hypotheses is based on simulations of an equilibrium model of residential sorting, estimated using data on almost a quarter of million households in the San Francisco Bay Area. In estimating the model, we are careful to use reasonable variation in the data that addresses the correlation of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics with unobserved housing and n eighborhood quality. The equilibrium model in combination with the estimated preference structure then provides a powerful analytical tool for carrying out general equilibrium counterfactual exercises that shed light on our two central hypotheses.
The results of these general equilibrium counterfactuals provide clear support for both hypotheses. First, we find that the elimination of racial differences in income (or education) would lead to an increase in the segregation of the high-income members of each major racial group in the Bay Area and to an increase in the overall segregation of Asian and Hispanic households. The partial equilibrium predictions of the model, which do not account for the formation of new neighborhoods, lead to the opposite conclusion for Asians and Hispanics and, in the case of overall black segregation, overstate the decrease that would follow the elimination of racial differences in income. This underlines the value of our GE approach. The results are bolstered by descriptive evidence based on an analysis of segregation patterns across metropolitan areas; this analysis shows that the segregation of highly-educated, minority households, and in many instances minority households in general, is an increasing function of the fraction of minority households with a college degree in the metropolitan area.
Our general equilibrium analysis has also provided evidence that racial sorting in the housing market (whether driven by preferences directly or discrimination) leads to large reductions in the consumption of neighborhood amenities by all black and Hispanic households, and large reductions in the consumption of housing amenities by high-income black and Hispanic households. In doing so, racial sorting in the housing market accentuates differences in the consumption of neighborhood amenities that arise as the result of racial differences in income and wealth, thereby potentially slowing racial convergence in education, income, and wealth over time. Note: Each entry in the table shows the average exposure of households of the race or race-income category shown in the row heading to households in the race or race-income category shown in the column heading. Panel C reports the average expsoure of households of each race to others of the same race in each income quartile. Note: Each entry in the table shows the average exposure of households of the race shown in the row heading to households of the race shown in the column heading. Numbers are reported for a counterfactual simulation that eliminates racial differences in income and wealth by replacing the income and wealth of the household in the p-th percentile of the income distribution within its own race with the income and wealth of the household in the p-th percentile of the overall income distribution. Notes: Tracts considered have a minimum of 800 households (the average tract in the US has almost 3,000 households) Exposure measures reported in fifth column of lower panel are the average fraction of black households in the Census tracts in which black households reside. 
Household Characteristic
Note: Parameter estimates reported with all variables normalized to have mean zero, standard deviation one. Standard errors are in parentheses.
